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REMEMBERING WHAT HURTS US MOST: A CRITIQUE
OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN LA W DESKBOOK
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W DESKBOOK
By the Conference of Western Attorneys General
Nicholas J. Spaeth, Chair, Editing Committee;
Julie Wrend, Clay Smith, Chief Editors
(University Press of Colorado, 1993)
Reviewed by Joseph William Singer*

[M]uch of what has been published [about American Indian law] has
been polemical rather than pure scholarship, not surprising given the
emotion this topic often arouses. '-American Indian Law Deskbook
How much do we remember of what hurts us most? I've been thinking
about pain, how each of us constructs our past to justify what we
feel now. 2
-Sherman Alexie
A new treatise on American Indian law has been published under the
auspices of a group of Attorneys General from some of the states in
the western United States.' The good news is that the American Indian
Law Deskbook is up-to-date, short, and clear. The bad news, however,
is that the book fails to live up to its promise of "objectivity." The
authors have an ax to grind. To put it simply, they consistently argue
in favor of increasing state power in Indian country and against the
exercise of tribal sovereignty when it affects non-Indians in any way.
These value choices are evident not only in the ways in which the authors
characterize the holdings of cases but in the choice of which cases to
criticize and which to leave uncriticized. It is important for judges,
practicing attorneys, law professors, and students to understand this when
using this book. Although the authors claim that their goal is "objective"
scholarship, 4 readers should understand that the book actually presents
an extended brief for the continued expansion of state power in Indian
country.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. Thanks and affection go to Martha Minow, Nell
Jessup Newton and Aviam Soifer.
1. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL,

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW

DESKBOOK xiii-xiv

(Nicholas J. Spaeth et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DESKBOOK].
2. SHmi.AN ALExiE, THE LONE RANGER AND TONTO FIsTFiGHT iN HEAVEN 196 (1993).
3. The principal authors are Clay Smith, Solicitor, Montana; Paula Smith, Assistant Attorney
General, Utah; Steve Strack, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho; Lawrence Coniff, Assistant Attorney
General & Senior Counsel, Washington; Charles Carvell, Assistant Attorney General, North Dakota;
Harley Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Montana; John Bartlett, Deputy Attorney General,
Nevada; Julie Wrend, Assistant Attorney General, Colorado. In addition, the editorial committee
included Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota; and Jim Johnson, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Washington.
4. DESBOOK, supra note 1, at xiv.
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The Deskbook does have its virtues. It is up-to-date and this is a good
thing because the law in this area is changing so rapidly. The Deskbook
reviews and analyzes the important cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court over the last ten years-cases which are missing from
the 1982 edition of Felix Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian Law5
and which are necessary to any understanding of current law. The Deskbook is also relatively short and clearly articulates broad principles underlying federal Indian law, thereby attempting to clarify an extremely
complicated and intractable subject.
Nonetheless, being up-to-date, short, and clear is an evil, rather than
a virtue, if the analysis of recent cases distorts the meaning of older
cases and if the description of basic principles oversimplifies the law and
misleads the reader. In an area of law as complicated as American Indian
law, being short and clear is decidedly not a virtue. Unfortunately, the
Deskbook is subject to these criticisms. It presents a biased, over-simplified
view of the law that is likely to mislead both litigants and judges.
The authors read extremely broad holdings into a few recent cases,
effectively suggesting that these recent cases have implicitly overruled
significant and long-standing precedents which appear to protect competing
interests. In so doing, the authors fail adequately to consider alternative
interpretations of the cases they discuss, including the ways in which the
holdings of the cases they champion may be narrowly construed in a
manner more consistent with prior law. Further, the authors stalwartly
reconcile cases that appear to contradict each other or to reflect competing
philosophies. Such cases might profitably be understood as embodying
the conflicting policies of promoting versus terminating tribal sovereignty
which have existed at various points in American history. Instead of
situating such cases historically and describing them as evidence of competing lines of precedent which have not been (and may never be) fully
reconciled, the authors attempt to reconcile these cases by privileging the
policy of one case and making the others appear either to constitute
narrow exceptions to those basic principles or to be wrongly decided.
As a result, the authors fail to recognize the unique and complex character
of American Indian law. Because American Indian law cases are only
infrequently overruled and because they embody contradictory philosophies, the courts often interpret them in ways that make them quite factspecific and of little precedential value. A better way to understand such
cases is to see them as embodying tensions or contradictions which are
not clearly resolved.
The Deskbook not only oversimplifies the law but does so in a predictable way. The authors consistently promote the expansion of state
power in Indian country which suggests a cramped and narrow interpretation of tribal sovereignty. Given who they are, it is not surprising
that the authors believe that it is important to increase the power of

5. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2d ed.

1982).
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state governments in Indian country and to decrease or eliminate the
power of tribal governments over non-members, especially non-Indian
residents living on reservations. One might even say the authors have a
vested interest in moving American Indian law in such a direction. The
authors felt free to criticize existing cases on the basis of these controversial
political views. There is nothing wrong with this; the authors are entitled
to express their views. However, the authors claim that the Deskbook
represents "pure scholarship" unhampered by such political goals or
controversial views about the appropriate relations among the federal,
state, and tribal governments. 6 Nothing could be further from the truth.
Not only do the authors' views determine which judicial opinions they
choose to criticize, but those views infect the Deskbook's interpretation
of existing case law. The Deskbook consistently oversimplifies the case
law and interprets it in a way that comports with the authors' political
views, while failing to acknowledge those views.
Have no doubt about it: The Deskbook is not "pure scholarship,"
but a brief for the authors' position, and not a very good one at that.
It is not very good because it fails to acknowledge the existence of
competing lines of precedent, competing plausible interpretations of existing cases, changing conceptions of the appropriate relations between
American Indian nations and the United States and the ways in which
these changing conceptions furnish a necessary backdrop against which
formative cases must be read and interpreted.
These failings are important. Indian law is complicated and few law
students or judges know anything about it. This means that judges (and
their law clerks) are likely to cite the Deskbook and rely on it for
guidance in deciding cases in the future. In so doing, these judges, their
clerks, and the lawyers who practice before them, may wrongly presume
that the Deskbook lives up to its promise of "objective" or "pure
scholarship," ' 7 and eschews "polemical" and "emotional ' 8 argument. My
main purpose in writing this review is to alert them to the "polemical"
nature of the Deskbook itself.
In addition to misleading judges and their clerks, the authors fail to
let Indian nations know that they may have plausible legal claims not
acknowledged in the Deskbook and therefore may wrongfully inhibit
Indian nations and their attorneys from pressing, in a litigation, legislative
or political context, legitimate tribal interests. Perhaps more important,
as a text written with the needs of the Western Attorneys General's
offices in mind, the Deskbook fails to alert assistant attorneys general
of the kinds of arguments that advocates for Indian nations are likely
to make, and to give them the tools to respond to such arguments. For
every broad interpretation the Deskbook provides of a case granting
extensive state power in Indian country, advocates for Indian nations,

6. DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at xiii.
7. Id. at xiii-xiv.
8. Id. at xiii.
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like myself, can come up with a dozen strategies for reading the case
narrowly as a way to protect tribal sovereignty and property. For every
narrow interpretation of a case recognizing tribal sovereignty, we are
able to respond with a dozen strategies for justifying the existence of
broad tribal power. Those strategies are not only based on normative
or political arguments; rather, in coming up with interpretations of federal
Indian law that support a broader interpretation of tribal sovereignty
and a narrow interpretation of state sovereignty, we can appeal to numerous cases-none of which has ever been overruled and each of which
is still cited and relied upon in the interpretation of American Indian
law.
American Indian law is one of the most complicated areas of federal
law-perhaps the most complicated one we have. Very few cases are ever
overruled, and many cases continue to be cited fifty, one-hundred, and
one-hundred-fifty years after they were decided. Conflicting lines of
precedent and conflicting philosophies concerning the relation of American
Indian nations to the United States provide a rich source of authority
on both sides of most contested questions. The existence of conflicts,
gaps, and ambiguities in enforceable judicial authority may be more true
in American Indian law than in any other field of law. Even the excellent
Nutshell on American Indian law, authored by Judge William C. Canby,
Jr., summarizes the law by describing conflicting lines of precedent. 9
Yet the Deskbook presents the case law as if it establishes a few broad
principles which can be illustrated by reference to multiple judicial authorities. The authors often describe a general principle and several cases
which are purported to support it. In the course of discussing the principle,
the authors may mention in passing major exceptions to the principle
they have sought to emphasize. However, they usually return to an
unqualified statement of the general principle in summarizing the meaning
of the cases they have discussed. 0 What worries me is whether judgesand their clerks-will read that carefully. There is a great danger that
they will notice the general principle and fail to focus on the exceptions
because those exceptions are deliberately marginalized. If a judge or clerk
looks for language to quote, they are likely to quote the Deskbook's
description of the general principle established by the case without attending to its limits. Yet in many cases, the exceptions come close to
swallowing the rule. In other cases, the authors have deliberately sought
to change the law by reversing the usual statement of the law. A conventional reading of the cases often creates a presumption in favor of
tribal sovereignty and against state sovereignty; the authors often reverse
the principle, arguing that state power prevails unless it is overcome by
federal or tribal interests.
For example, the authors begin their discussion of general civil-regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country by suggesting that, while tribes retain

9. JUDGE WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16-31.

INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL

(2d ed. 1988).
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''some quantum of inherent authority that exists outside any affirmative
congressional grant of power . . . . [the] states may regulate the onreservation activities of tribes, their members, and nonmembers where,
on balance, state interests in such regulation are consistent with or
otherwise outweigh any federal and tribal interests emanating from applicable federal statutes and regulations or from treaties."" This description of the law suggests that states are presumptively entitled to
regulate on-reservation activities of tribes and their members, but that
such a presumption can be overcome by an overriding federal interest.
This is an extremely odd way to describe the existing law. In fact, sixteen
pages later, the authors note that "a state's interests will justify regulation
of a tribe or its members only in 'exceptional circumstances."" ' 12 It would
therefore be more accurate-or less misleading-to explain that states
generally have no power to regulate tribes or their members inside Indian
country.
The authors also mislead the reader by using string citations in footnotes
to support the broad principles they have announced. While the long
footnotes are a valuable source guide for research, they deceive the reader
by pretending that the facts of the cases in the footnotes are irrelevant.
This is a grave mistake; both the historical period in which those cases
were decided, and their particular facts, create important ambiguities in
the law. Moreover, the authors often fail to draw the reader's attention
to cases which "go the other way." Sometimes they note opposing cases
by citing them in a footnote with the designation "Cf.," without addressing directly-that is, in the text-the contradiction between the interpretation they offer and the result in the decided case.
A few examples should suffice to elucidate the Deskbook's oversimplified and biased view of American Indian law. Let us start with property
rights. An early chapter, entitled Indian and Reservation Lands, summarizes the rules and principles governing tribal property. The authors
note the distinction between original Indian title and recognized title.
"There are two sources of tribal land occupancy rights: an aboriginal
entitlement premised on exclusive use of a particular territory at the time
of first Euro-American contact; or an entitlement arising subsequent to
such contact pursuant to the governing sovereign's laws."' 3 The Deskbook
notes that the most significant difference between these two types of
property rights is that lands held under aboriginal title have been held
not to constitute "property" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause.' 4 Significantly, although the authors criticize numerous
cases, they chose not to criticize the case which established this principle.
They voice not a single word of criticism of this outrageous rule of law,
first promulgated in 1955 in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States," in

i.
12.
13.
14.
15.

DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 98.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 39.
Id.at 40.
348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
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the midst of the Termination Era. The authors fail to note the racist
arguments underlying the opinion and its technical deficiencies in misrepresenting precedent. 6 They also fail to note the ways in which the
Tee-Hit-Ton doctrine denies American Indian nations-and their members-equal protection of the laws.
Nor do the authors note Tee-Hit-Ton's implicit reliance on Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock,'7 a case that has often been called the Dred Scott 8 of
American Indian law. Lone Wolf held that Congress could abrogate
Indian treaties with impunity and that there were no constitutional limits
of any kind on Congressional power over Indian nations.' 9 Lone Wolf
itself is cited only twice in the entire book, and each time approvingly
and without comment or criticism. The Deskbook authors cite Lone Wolf
favorably for the proposition that "[treaty-secured rights can be legislatively abrogated" 20 without noting that this ruling justified and promoted
forced allotment of Indian lands and immunized the United States from
the takings clause for more than thirty years-during which two-thirds
of all Indian land was transferred from Indian nations to non-Indians.
On page 177 of the Deskbook, the authors note, in a footnote, that the
federal government has the power to quantify Indian water rights protected
by the Winters doctrine, and that the ability to define Indian water rights
"stems from the power to affect, and even dispose of, Indian property
rights." ' 2' In so arguing, the authors ever so gently suggest that Lone
Wolf gives the federal government the power to abrogate, rather than
define, tribal property rights. Further, by citing Lone Wolf, they suggest
that it would be legitimate for the federal government to "dispose of"
tribal property rights without the consent of the affected tribe and without
compensation.
This suggestion misstates current law. Water rights are property rights
which cannot be taken without just compensation if they are recognized
by treaty. Although Lone Wolf has never been formally overruled, its
conclusion that Congress may abrogate recognized title without paying22
compensation has been decisively (although not completely) rejected.
Moreover, citing Lone Wolf approvingly in this manner is extremely
offensive. It is as if the treatise writers had cited Dred Scott 23 approvingly

for the proposition that African Americans are not persons within the
meaning of the Constitution, without acknowledging both the fundamental
injustice of that proposition and the fact that it was altered by the
Fourteenth Amendment.

16. Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31
HASTINGs L.J. 1215 (1980); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV.
1 (1991); Joseph William Singer, Well Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian
Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994).
17. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
18. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
19. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
20. DESKBOOK, supra note i, at 14.
21. Id. at 177 n.67.
22. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
23. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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In addition to supporting the expropriation of Indian property without
just compensation, the authors mildly suggest that "[a]lthough aboriginal
title in the past constituted a significant basis for tribal occupancy rights,
that title has likely been extinguished in its entirety. '24 This is an inaccurate, implausible, and destructive assertion. Two pages before making
this provocative claim, the Deskbook accurately states the canons of
interpretation governing extinguishment of original Indian title. Extinguishment can "be effected only by Congress, through either treaty
ratification or statute, or the Executive Branch acting pursuant to legislative direction and by the voluntary abandonment of aboriginal territory
by the involved tribe." ' 25 If this is correct-and it is-then it is highly
unlikely that all original Indian title has been lawfully extinguished.
First, consider that the state of New York violated the Trade and
Intercourse Acts and illegally attempted to extinguish the original Indian
title to vast stretches of land belonging to the Six Nations in the Iroquois
League without prior approval of the federal government. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized a common law right of action
against the states for violation of the Trade and Intercourse Acts. 26 It
has further recognized that a breach of trust action may, in some cases,
be made against the federal government for failing adequately to protect
tribal property rights.2 7 Second, consider that non-Indian settlement in
New England often forced resident tribes to retreat to other lands in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, and Canada where they continued
to live among the growing non-Indian population without receiving compensation for the lands they were forced to abandon. 28 Although the
Vermont Supreme Court recently ruled that the title of the Abenaki
Nation to all its lands in the State of Vermont was extinguished by the
"increasing weight of history," its decision both misapplies existing extinguishment doctrine and deprives the Missisquoi Abenakis of equal
protection of the laws, as the contrary conclusion of the trial court in
29
that case demonstrates.
To support the argument that original Indian title has been fully-and
lawfully-extinguished, the authors cite Felix Cohen's analysis of original
Indian title for the proposition that "[flortunately for the security of
American real estate titles, the business of securing cessions of Indian
titles has been, on the whole, conscientiously pursued by the Federal
Government .... *"0 While it is true that the United States followed a

24. DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 45.
25. Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).
26. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
27. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
753 (1992).
28. Singer, Well Settled?, supra note 16.
29. State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992). For extended critiques of this opinion, see Singer,
Well Settled?, supra note 16; John Lowndes, Aboriginal Title: Extinguishment by the Increasing
Weight of History, 42 BUFF. L. REV.
- (forthcoming 1994).
30. DESKBOOK, supra note I, at 45 n.33.
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consistent policy of negotiating treaties with Indian nations prior to
authorizing land settlement by United States citizens, it is also true that
this principle was violated in various ways in practice, as the above
examples demonstrate. The only other authority cited to support the
proposition that original Indian title has been fully extinguished is a case
which goes the other way. This case holds that the original title of the
Cayuga Nation had not been extinguished;' 3 the authors simply note this
case in the footnote with an ironic "Cf." 1
Regarding the issue of tribal sovereignty, the Deskbook authors are
in favor of the proposition that Indian nations have no regulatory or
adjudicatory power over nonmembers unless those nonmembers have
established a voluntary relationship with the tribe or a tribal member
through contract or through entering tribal land. Effectively, the Deskbook proposes an extremely broad interpretation of the plurality decision32
in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation.
Brendale addressed the question of whether the state or the Yakima
Nation (or both concurrently) had the power to apply its zoning law to
fee land owned by nonmembers inside the reservation. Four members of
the Supreme Court 33 who joined a plurality opinion written by Justice
White would have held that Indian nations have no power whatsoever34
over fee lands owned by nonmembers anywhere inside the reservation.
Three members of the Court 3" who dissented in an opinion written by
Justice Blackmun would have held that Indian nations retain regulatory
power over all lands inside the reservation unless that power is expressly
abrogated by Congressional statute or treaty.3 6 Two Justices, Stevens and
O'Connor, cast the deciding votes holding that Indian nations have
areas
regulatory power over nonmember lands only if they are located in
37
of the reservation with no "significant" nonmember ownership.
The Brendale decision is inherently unstable. First, the rule of law
promulgated by the Court is not easily administrable; it is hard for states
and Indian nations to know whether or not they have the power to
impose their zoning regulations on particular parcels. Second, the compromise adopted by the Court is fully accepted by only two of its members.
Third, three Justices have left the Court since 1989. Justice White, author
of the plurality decision, has retired from the bench. It is likely that
Justice Thomas will take his place as an advocate of the plurality de-

31. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 771 F. Supp. 1924 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). The
authors' parenthetical description of this case reads: "holding the defense of laches unavailable to
private and public landowners against 185-year-old aboriginal title claim even though decision 'may
eventually cause disruption in Cayuga and Seneca Counties."' DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 45 n.33.
This description of the case appears to acknowledge that the statement in the text is false.
32. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
33. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy.
34. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425-26 (opinion of White, J.).
35. Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun.
36. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 466-67 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
37. Id. at 441-42 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
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cision.3 8 Justices Brennan and Marshall have also left the Court. Justice
Souter, it seems, will probably refuse to join the plurality decision given
the fact that he and Justice Blackmun were the only two Justices to
dissent from the Court's recent decision in South Dakota v. Bourland.3 9
Souter will most likely join Stevens and O'Connor in their compromise
view. Given this line-up-four Justices supporting the plurality decision,
two (or three) Justices supporting the compromise position, and one
Justice remaining from the dissent-Justice Ginsburg has the deciding
vote. It is difficult to predict how Ginsburg will view these questions,
but all indications show that she would be far more likely to join her
colleagues Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter than sign-on with the plurality.
If this is an accurate depiction of the current Court, the plurality opinion
in Brendale does not represent the current law, and is not likely to do
so in the near future. Yet the authors of the Deskbook argue for the
position taken by the plurality opinion of Justice White.4 Moreover, not
only do the authors argue for the plurality opinion, but they use it as
a basis for describing the principles underlying tribal and state sovereignty
in Indian country.
The authors begin their discussion of "General Civil-Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country" in Chapter 5 by discussing Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,41 a 1978 case which held that tribes have no
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.4 2 The Court, however, has never
interpreted tribal civil regulatory power as narrowly as it has interpreted
tribal criminal jurisdiction. To use Oliphant as the primary precedent
from which to understand the extremely complicated mix of civil regulatory
doctrines not only misrepresents those doctrines but suggests that tribal
power is far narrower than it is and that state power is far broader than
it is.
After discussing Oliphant, the authors move on to United States v.
Wheeler,43 a case which reasoned that inherent tribal sovereignty preexists and is not derived from federal power, although it is subject to
plenary federal power. The Court's holding made dual prosecutions of
a tribal member under tribal law and federal law permissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause since the federal prosecution does not constitute
a second prosecution by the same government. The authors cite Wheeler
for the proposition that "[tihe areas in which ... implicit divestiture
of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the
relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe" and
38. As evidence, see Justice Thomas's opinion in South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309
(1993).
39. 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2321 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. In fact, the authors argue for an interpretation of tribal sovereignty which is even more
limited than Justice White's Brendale opinion. Justice White recognized a tribal right to go into
state court to challenge state power when it has a significant effect on tribal interests. The Deskbook
authors mention this limitation on state sovereignty when they discuss Brendale but ignore it in
most of their discussions about the legitimate scope of tribal power.
41. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
42. DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 101.
43. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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that "the powers of self-government . . . are of a different type [since
they] involve only the relations among members of a tribe." ' " The Deskbook comments that this principle "distinguishes between internal and
external relations, ' 4 suggesting that tribes retain no inherent sovereign
power over nonmembers.
This description of Wheeler is inaccurate. First, tribes clearly retain
inherent sovereign power over nonmembers who enter tribal land or who
enter consensual relations with the tribe. Even the plurality opinion of
Brendale 6 and the recent opinion in Bourland47 recognize this. Second,
the quoted language in Wheeler merely stated that the areas of sovereignty
which have been divested have been in the category of member-nonmember
relations; it did not in any way constitute a statement that all sovereignty
over nonmembers has been divested. As noted above, this is simply not
true.
Immediately after the authors' discussion of Oliphant, Wheeler, and
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,48 they note that Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation affirmed the power of
Indian nations to impose sales taxes on non-Indians who purchase cigarettes on the reservation. 49 The authors correctly note that this case
stands for the proposition that tribes retain sovereign power over "consensual on-reservation transactions between tribes and nonmembers." 50
On the other hand, they fail to note that tribes retain sovereign power
over non-Indians who enter tribal land, whether or not they have otherwise
established a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members. Thus,
the authors mischaracterize Montana v. United States5' as standing for
the proposition that "far from being the rule, the presence of inherent
tribal authority over nonmembers was the exception. 5 2 In fact, Montana
held that tribal power over nonmembers was the exception only in the
case of regulation of activities of nonmembers on fee lands inside the
reservation. 3 While it is true that Montana appears to have effectuated
a dramatic-and unfortunate-change in the law of tribal sovereignty,
tribal power over nonmembers is much broader than the authors want
to admit. Finally, they note in passing, but fail to emphasize, that the
Brendale in no way apply to nonrules promulgated in Montana and
4
lands.
tribal
on
conduct
Indian

supra note 1, at 103 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
Id. at 102.
See supra note 33.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
436 U.S. 49 (1978) (affirming the power of tribes to determine their own membership).
447 U.S. 134 (1980).
DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 104.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
52. DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 105.
53. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
54. Not until the authors turn to Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), on page 109, do they
note that "inherent tribal regulatory authority extends to nonmembers only when express or constructive consent is present, such as through voluntary on-reservation business transactions with
tribes or use of tribal lands." DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 109.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

DESKBOOK,
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It must be conceded that the authors appear to have foreseen-and
would doubtless applaud-the broad language of the recent United States
Supreme Court case of South Dakota v. Bourland.1 Bourland appears
to deprive Indian nations of all regulatory power over non-members for
conduct inside reservations unless those non-members have either voluntarily entered a contract with the tribe or have entered tribal land.
Yet, there are many conventional ways to limit the holding of Bourland,
consistent with Indian law precedent. As a factual matter, Bourland is
limited to the question of whether tribes retain the right to regulate
hunting and fishing of non-members on lands inside the reservation owned
in fee by the United States. In addition, Bourland can be viewed as a
narrow statutory interpretation question; the opinion rests on a construction of the particular statute which authorized the taking of property of
the Cheyenne Sioux Tribe for use to build a dam. Viewed in this way,
the opinion has no precedential value. Perhaps it can be cited for the
narrow proposition that when Congress passes a statute authorizing the
taking of tribal property, compensates the tribe for the property taken,
and the statute effectuating the taking recites that the sum paid by the
United States "shall be in final and complete settlement of all claims,
rights, and demands ' 5 6 of the tribe or its allottees, that we have sufficient
evidence of Congressional intent to extinguish all tribal power over nonIndians on the taken lands. 7 In sum, although it is certainly possible
that Bourland may presage the adoption of an extremely restrictive theory
of tribal sovereignty, it is by no means certain-especially when we
consider the replacement of Justice White by Justice Ginsburg.
The Deskbook's interpretation and heavy reliance on Brendale fails to
adequately consider precedents that go the other way. Specifically, it
leaves no room for the 1985 case of National Farmers Union Insurance
Cos. v. Crow Tribe" and the 1987 case of Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.
v. LaPlante. 9 In both cases, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts
had initial jurisdiction to determine whether they had subject matter
jurisdiction over tort suits involving relations between tribal members and
nonmembers on the reservation, even when the lawsuit is based on conduct
occurring on fee lands owned by nonmembers 0 It may therefore be
possible to interpret Montana, Brendale, and Bourland as encompassing
land use regulation but having no relevance to other areas of civil
regulatory jurisdiction, such as taxation, contract, tort, or family law.
In National Farmers, a young boy who was a tribal member was
injured by a motorcycle driven by someone else on the grounds of a

55. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
56. Id. at 2317 (quoting Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 776, 68 Stat. 1191).
57. Tribal power over its members persists because the statute did not expressly diminish the
borders of the reservation, and existing presumptions protect tribal sovereignty by requiring clear
evidence of an intent to diminish reservation borders.
58. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
59. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
60. See Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14-16.
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school owned and operated by a school district which constituted a
subdivision of the state of Montana. The plaintiff sued the school district
in tribal court for negligent failure to adequately supervise the children
while in the school's parking lot. 61 When the school district failed to
appear to defend the claim, the tribal court entered a default judgment
against it. The school and its insurer filed a claim in federal district
court for a declaration that the Crow Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction
over the school district. The Court held, unanimously, that the federal
courts could not hear the case until62 the plaintiffs had exhausted all
possible remedies in the tribal court.
The Court refused to extend the rule of Oliphant that tribes lack
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the civil jurisdiction area. Justice
Stevens concluded that:
[T]he answer to the question whether a tribal court has the power
to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians in a case
of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as an extension of Oliphant
would require. Rather, the existence and extent of a tribal court's
jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty,
the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or
diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive
in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative
Branch policy as embodied
63
or judicial decisions.
In Iowa Mutual, a tribal member employed and insured by an insurance
company was injured in an accident on the reservation and sued the
insurance company in tribal court for bad faith refusal to settle. The
Court extended the ruling of National Farmers (premised on federal
question jurisdiction) to diversity jurisdiction, holding that "[clivil jurisdiction [over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands] presumptively lies in tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific
treaty provision or federal statute." 6"
The Deskbook authors criticize these two cases and suggest that they
should be interpreted in light of Brendale65 and Duro v. Reina. 66 They
argue that Iowa Mutual has "spawned confusion ' 67 by suggesting that
tribal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over all claims involving
non-Indian activities on the reservation. The authors would read Iowa
Mutual as holding that the tribe has adjudicatory jurisdiction (power to
hear a case in tribal court) only where it has regulatory jurisdiction (the
power to apply tribal law)6 and that the tribe has no power to apply

61. Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
6019 (Crow Tribal Ct. 1982).
62. 471 U.S. at 855.
63. Id. at 855-56.
64. 480 U.S. at 18.

65. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
66. 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
67. DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 126, 134.
68. Id. at 136.
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tribal law to nonmembers for conduct on nontribal land. This interpretation of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual would force the tribes to
engage in the pointless exercise of taking jurisdiction over tort claims
involving nonmember activities on fee lands only to issue repeated rulings
that the tribe has no jurisdiction over the case. Such an absurd exercise
would effectively make a mockery of both National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual.
Further, the authors argue that tribal courts only have jurisdiction over
cases in which tribal law applies or in which the nonmember has consented
to the tribal court's jurisdiction. 69 They would therefore find a tribal
court powerless to hear a tort claim by a tribal member against a
nonmember occurring on fee land inside the reservation if the Supreme
Court extends Brendale and Montana from land use regulation to the
area of tort law, or if the issue to be determined in court concerns the
question of whether state law has been preempted by a federal statute.70
The authors presume that tribal courts have no special expertise in
interpreting and applying state or federal law and therefore have no
legitimate right to adjudicate controversies not based on tribal law even
when the case concerns activity on the reservation which affects the tribe
or its members. They note, but deplore, the fact that "[llower federal
generally failed to recognize [this] limitation on Iowa
courts have thus far
71
deferral."
Mutual
Yet the authors give no reason for interpreting tribal subject matter
jurisdiction so narrowly. Significantly, the Supreme Court, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,72 interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA) as granting extremely limited federal court jurisdiction. While
the Act imposes many of the requirements of the Bill of Rights on tribal
governments, the Court interpreted the Act as granting tribal courts the
sole power, in most instances, to interpret and apply the federal standards
imposed by the Act itself. The ICRA therefore represents a major instance
in which the Court recognizes the competence of tribal courts to apply
and enforce federal law-even when it limits the power of tribal governments.
The Deskbook of course takes a dim view of the ruling in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, noting that "[h]earings held before the United States
Commissioner on Civil Rights concerning ICRA enforcement included
allegations of repeated due process violations by tribes" and obliquely
suggesting that Congress consider passing an amendment to the ICRA
to allow for federal court jurisdiction to challenge the actions of tribal
governments and courts. 73 The authors nowhere criticize the failure of
federal courts to take tribal interests seriously. They fail to note, for
example, that the trial court in Brendale found, and the Supreme Court

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 127-31.
Id. at 130.
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 165-66.
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agreed, that the construction of twenty houses on a large parcel of land
would not imperil "any interest of the Yakima Nation" even though the
tribal zoning ordinance would have prohibited development entirely.7 4 As
I have previously argued, this conclusion "grants tribal interests no weight
at all.''

75

The relationship between the adjudicatory jurisdiction cases (National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual) and the legislative jurisdiction cases (Montana,
Brendale, Bourland) is complicated and the reach of both of these lines
of cases is not yet settled. The Deskbook proposes a simple solution:
tribes have no power over nonmembers unless the nonmember has entered
tribal land or made a contract with the tribe or a tribal member. Yet
this simple solution privileges the holdings of Brendale and Bourland
over the holdings of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual. It also assumes
that the legislative jurisdiction cases apply to all issues rather than being
limited to the area of land use regulation. An alternative reading of these
cases is possible and it would not implicitly overrule (or give little scope
to) the adjudicatory jurisdiction cases, but it would limit the damage the
land use regulation cases have had. The authors never consider seriously
alternative interpretations. Nor do they confront the fact that their proposals, if accepted, would impose the continued abrogation of solemn
treaties.
The truth about the legal relationships between American Indian nations
and the United States is complex. The Deskbook reduces that complexity
to serve the purpose of ensuring that non-Indians are never involuntarily
subject to the authority of Indian nations. The authors do not recognize
that this purpose inevitably makes Indian nations involuntarily subject
to the authority of non-Indians and of the government of the United
States. Most significantly, the authors fail to acknowledge that such a
policy entails the abrogation of treaties. This failure to remember the
past or to acknowledge lawful obligations is a mechanism for denial "of
what hurts us most," effectively "construct[ing] the past to justify what
' 76
we feel now."

In Sherman Alexie's powerful new book, The Lone Ranger and Tonto
Fistfight in Heaven, a character named Norma was always trying to save
the tribe, "watching out for those of us that were so close to drowning." ' 77
In her role as "cultural lifeguard, ' 78 she taught that "[e]verything
matters ....
Even the little things. ' 79 Because everything matters, it is
essential not to reduce the complexity of human experience to satisfy
our need for order. "'Listen,' Norma said. 'Pete Rose played major
league baseball in four different decades, has more hits than anybody
in history ....
But after all that, all that greatness, he's only remembered

74. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432.
75. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, supra note 16, at 37.
76. ALEXIE, supra note 2, at 196.

77. Id. at 199.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 200.
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for the bad stuff." '' 80 Just as it is important to remember the fullness
of a person's life, it is important not to deny the past to justify the
present. In oversimplifying the law, the Deskbook tries to avoid grappling
with the current implications of past injustice. The details that are overlooked and the case law that is reduced to slogans will not disappear
simply because they are unacknowledged by the authors. Redemption
comes from remembering the details. 81 Everything matters, especially the
little things.

80. Id. at 210.
81. "The key to redemption is remembrance." Aviam Soifer, "The Task of Hearing What Has
(forthcoming
Already Been Said:" History and Native American Legal Claims, 28 GA. L. REV.
1994) (quoting Baal Shem Tov).

